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When is a director or ofmcer personally liable in tort to a party who is not the corporation
he or she serves? In Canada, there is no clear answer. The law is marked by division
both within and between appellate courts, resulting in judgments that are hard to
reconcile and verge on arbitrary. This is likely attributable to the mistaken belief that
there is a tension between personal liability and corporate personality, as well as the
disputed relationship between common law and statutory obligations. To address
these challenges, most Canadian courts have followed a threshold corporate law
analysis, which seeks to categorize the allegations as either corporate or personal.
When applied, this approach often results in directors and ofmcers having immunity
with respect to torts they committed in pursuit of the corporation’s interests. Such
immunity, however, has no basis in law. Canada’s business corporations statutes do
not limit the liability of directors and ofmcers, and implicitly contemplate their exposure
to tort claims.
Accordingly, I propose that directors and ofmcers ought to be personally liable when
they are implicated in facts that give rise to a cause of action in tort, regardless of
whether their actions may be considered authorized by, or in the interests of, the
corporation. This approach is conceptually simpler and more respectful of legislative
intent, while posing no serious policy concerns. This is because ordinary tort law
principles are sufmciently robust to bar improper personal claims, such as those that
do not implicate the director or ofmcer, those that are inconsistent with the expectations
of the parties, or those that connict with statutory obligations or remedies.
Quand un administrateur ou un dirigeant est-il personnellement responsable en
responsabilité délictuelle envers une partie qui n’est pas la société pour laquelle il
travaille? Au Canada, il n’y a pas de réponse claire. Le droit est marqué par la division
au sein des cours d’appel et entre elles, ce qui donne lieu à des jugements difmciles
à concilier et qui frisent l’arbitraire. Cette situation est probablement attribuable à la
croyance erronée selon laquelle il existe une tension entre la responsabilité personnelle
et la personnalité morale, ainsi qu’à la relation contestée entre la common law et les
obligations légales. Pour relever ces déms, la plupart des tribunaux canadiens ont suivi
une analyse préliminaire du droit des sociétés, qui vise à classer les allégations dans la
catégorie des sociétés ou des particuliers. Lorsqu’elle est appliquée, cette approche
fait souvent en sorte que les administrateurs et les dirigeants jouissent de l’immunité à
l’égard des délits civils qu’ils ont commis dans la poursuite des intérêts de l’entreprise.
Cette immunité n’a toutefois aucun fondement en droit. Les lois canadiennes sur les
sociétés par actions ne limitent pas la responsabilité des administrateurs et des
dirigeants et envisagent implicitement leur exposition aux poursuites en responsabilité
délictuelle.
Par conséquent, je propose que les administrateurs et les dirigeants soient tenus
personnellement responsables lorsqu’ils sont impliqués dans des faits qui donnent
lieu à une cause d’action délictuelle, peu importe si leurs actions peuvent être
considérées comme autorisées par la société ou dans son intérêt. Cette approche
est conceptuellement plus simple et plus respectueuse de l’intention du législateur,
tout en ne posant pas de problèmes stratégiques sérieux. En effet, les principes
ordinaires du droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle sont sufmsamment solides pour
empêcher les réclamations personnelles abusives, comme celles qui n’impliquent pas
l’administrateur ou le dirigeant, celles qui sont incompatibles avec les attentes des
parties ou celles qui sont contraires aux obligations légales ou aux recours.

* Associate Professor & Associate Dean, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law. I am grateful
to Kelsey Bennett, a third-year law student, for her exceptional research assistance, the participants
in the 2018 Purdy Crawford Emerging Business Law Scholars Workshop for their feedback, and the
anonymous reviewers and editors for their constructive comments. Any errors are mine.
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Introduction
7KHSUHVLGHQWRIDFRPSDQ\GLUHFWHGDQHPSOR\HHWRZRUNLQFRQGLWLRQVWKDW
KHNQHZRURXJKWWRKDYHNQRZQZHUHGDQJHURXV7KHSUHVLGHQWGLGWKLV
EHFDXVHVXVSHQGLQJSURGXFWLRQDQGLQVWDOOLQJVDIHW\HTXLSPHQWZRXOGQRW
EHLQWKH¿QDQFLDOEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\7KHHPSOR\HHGLHG7KH
SUHVLGHQWDUJXHGWKDWKLVSULPDU\GXW\RIFDUHZDVWRWKHFRPSDQ\QRWWR
WKHHPSOR\HH0RUHRYHUWKHFRPSDQ\LVDVHSDUDWHOHJDOSHUVRQWKDWRXJKW
WREHUHVSRQVLEOHIRULWVRZQZURQJGRLQJ7RKROGWKHSUHVLGHQWSHUVRQDOO\
OLDEOHLQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVZRXOGXQGHUPLQHZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGSULQFLSOHV
RIFRUSRUDWHODZRSHQWKHÀRRGJDWHVRIOLWLJDWLRQE\LQYLWLQJVHFRQGDU\
FODLPVDQGGLVFRXUDJHEXVLQHVVSHRSOHE\H[SRVLQJWKHPWRLQGHWHUPLQDWH
OLDELOLW\7KHYLFWLP¶VUHODWLYHVDUJXHGWKDWWKHLUORYHGRQHSUREDEO\GLG
QRWNQRZWKDWKLVHPSOR\HUZDVWHFKQLFDOO\DFRUSRUDWLRQ,QUHDOLW\WKH
SUHVLGHQWZDVSHUVRQDOO\LQFRQWURORIWKHZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVDQGRQWKH
GD\LQTXHVWLRQKHSHUVRQDOO\GLUHFWHGWKHYLFWLPWRSHUIRUPWKHWDVNWKDW
NLOOHGKLP7RQRWKROGWKHSUHVLGHQWSHUVRQDOO\OLDEOHZRXOGRIIHQGWKH
SULQFLSOH WKDW HYHU\RQH LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU KLV RU KHU RZQ ZURQJGRLQJ
FRQGRQHXVLQJWKHFRUSRUDWHIRUPWRFRPPLWSUR¿WDEOHKDUPDQGOHDYH
YLFWLPVXQFRPSHQVDWHGLIWKHFRPSDQ\LVMXGJPHQWSURRI
7KHVHZHUHWKHEDVLFIDFWVDUJXPHQWVDQGSROLF\LQWHUHVWVDWVWDNHLQ
Lewis v BoutilierRQHRIWKHHDUOLHVW&DQDGLDQFDVHVWRVTXDUHO\DGGUHVVWKH
SHUVRQDOOLDELOLW\RIGLUHFWRUVDQGRI¿FHUVIRUWRUWVFRPPLWWHGDJDLQVWWKRVH
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other than the corporation.1 The majority of the Supreme Court held that
the president was personally liable for the death of his employee because
he was personally implicated in negligence. Mignault J stated that “even
granting the employment of the boy by the company, an action would
lie against Mr. Lewis if he personally put the boy at a dangerous work
without proper safeguards to protect him from mishap.”2 Importantly, the
Court reached this result even though the president was acting within the
course of his duties and pursuing, in a narrow sense, the best interests of
the company.
In the early 1980s, in Berger v Willowdale, the majority of the Ontario
Court of Appeal endorsed Lewis and held that company representatives
may be personally liable for acts of omission as well as acts of commission.3
The case involved an employee who was injured after slipping on an
ice-covered walkway, the clearing of which the company’s president
had neglected. Cory JA (as he then was) held that there were no policy
grounds to exclude the president’s personal liability. The fact that the
corporate employer has a duty of care to its employees does not shield
its executive of¿cers from liability if they were personally implicated in
the wrongdoing.4 Cory JA dismissed the danger of Àoodgates opening
as an “in terrorem argument without foundation.”5 He reasoned that the
personal liability of directors and of¿cers would be circumscribed by
close scrutiny of the facts, which would have to show that the director or
of¿cer was personally at fault.6 Conversely, the dissenting judgment of
Weatherston JA framed the issue as one of corporate personality. Citing
the seminal case of Salomon v A Salomon & Co, Weatherston JA held that
the president’s duty was to the company, which in turn owed a duty to the
employee.7 As a result, were it not barred by the Workers’ Compensation
Act, the proper target of the plaintiff’s claim would have been the company
for which she worked, not its president.
Thus, 60 years after the Supreme Court’s judgment in Lewis, the
divided result in Berger signaled some uncertainty about the extent to
which directors and of¿cers may be liable in tort to third parties (i.e., non-

1.
See Lewis v Boutilier, 52 DLR 383, [1919] SCJ no 83 [Lewis cited to DLR].
2.
Ibid at para 60.
3.
See Berger v Willowdale AMC et al* (1983), 41 OR (2d) 89, 145 DLR (3d) 247 (CA) [Berger
cited to OR].
4.
See ibid at 98.
5.
Ibid at 99.
6.
See ibid.
7.
See ibid at 102, 107, citing Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd (1897), [1897] AC 22, [1896] JCJ
No 5 (HL) [Salomon].
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company plaintiffs).8 Unfortunately, the confusion has only deepened in
the last 35 years. Although this is an issue that is as old as corporate law
itself, today it is the source of considerable division both between and
even within Canadian appellate courts, resulting in uncertainty for litigants
and judgments that are dif¿cult to reconcile. As discussed in further detail
below, the high courts of Ontario and British Columbia vacillate between
permissive and restrictive approaches to third-party claims, while the
Alberta Court of Appeal has a restrictive posture.
The muddled state of the law in this area is due to a combination of
daunting conceptual problems, relatively scant and differing scholarly
opinion, and no clear guidance from the Supreme Court.9 As the synopses
of Lewis and Berger indicate, these claims expose apparent tensions
between corporate personality and personal responsibility, which are
too often resolved based on the policy preferences of individual judges,
instead of a recognized legal framework. A further complication is the
effect of corporate law statutes, which are an independent source of civil
obligations of directors and of¿cers. The relationship between these
statutes and the scope of directors’ and of¿cers’ liability to third parties

8.
Before Berger, Le Dain JA (as he then was) wrote a judgment that suggested directors and
of¿cers are generally not liable for wrongdoing that arises in the ordinary course of their duties
(Mentmore v National Merchandise Manufacturing Co, 89 DLR (3d) 195 at paras 204-205, [1978]
FCJ no 521 [Mentmore]). This was a patent infringement case in which the plaintiff sought to hold the
plaintiff liable because he was the president of the company that manufactured the infringing product.
Unlike most torts, liability for patent infringement is strict as opposed to fault-based. As Le Dain JA’s
reasons suggest, with a strict liability wrong that Àows from core business activities there will usually
be no basis for distinguishing between corporate and personal wrongdoing: (ibid). This why Le Dain
JA held that a corporate representative will only be liable for patent infringement that is attributable
to fault on his or her part, speci¿cally “deliberate, willful and knowing pursuit” of likely infringing
activity or “indifference to the risk of [infringement]” (ibid). As a result, even though Mentmore is
sometimes cited for the proposition that directors and of¿cers are generally immune from personal
liability in tort, it is reconcilable with the analysis proposed in this paper, which focuses on fault as the
basis for imposing such liability.
9.
See e.g. Edward M Iacobucci, “Un¿nished Business: An Analysis of Stones Unturned in ADGA
Systems International v. Valcom Ltd” (2001) 35:1 Can Bus LJ 39 at 40 (making no “attempt to resolve
the dif¿cult question of the optimal law governing personal liability.”); Christopher C Nicholls,
“Liability of Corporate Of¿cers and Directors to Third Parties” (2001) 35:1 Can Bus LJ 1 (recognizing
that limited liability does not apply to directors and of¿cers and concluding that proximity between
directors/of¿cers and third parties may arise in different ways, which calls for a nuanced analytical
approach); Janis Sarra, “The Corporate Veil Lifted: Director and Of¿cer Liability to Third Parties”
(2001) 35:1 Can Bus LJ 55 (describing such liability as lifting the corporate veil, but proposing that
directors and of¿cers ought to be personally liable as long as their wrongdoing is speci¿cally pleaded);
David Debenham, “The Scylla of Motions Court and the Charybdis of the Court Of Appeal: The
Scope of Directors’ and Of¿cers’ Common Law Liabilities in The Post-ADGA Era” (2001) 25:1 Adv
Q 21 (endorsing the judgment in ADGA Systems and proposing that it be expanded to unintentional
torts based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors); Robert Flannigan, “The
Personal Tort Liability of Directors” (2002) 81:2 Can Bar Rev 247 (arguing that there is no doctrinal
or policy basis for special treatment of directors and of¿cers).
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is an aspect of the controversy that is particularly undeveloped in judicial
and scholarly writing.10 While the Supreme Court has hinted that /HZLV
is still good law, it has not gone out of its way to broadcast that message,
nor has it squarely addressed the contending arguments surrounding this
issue. As a result, the persistent confusion in this most fundamental area of
corporate law is as understandable as it is lamentable.
In this article, I propose that Canadian courts follow a strictly tortbased analysis in determining whether a personal, third-party claim against
a director or of¿cer ought to proceed. I argue that the prevailing threshold
corporate law analysis, which seeks to categorize the allegations as either
corporate or personal, is problematic and ought to be rejected. When courts
focus on whether the impugned behaviour may be considered authorized
by or in the interests of the corporation, directors and of¿cers often emerge
with immunity for torts they committed in the course of their duties. Such
immunity, however, is inconsistent with Canada’s corporate statutes,
which do not limit the liability of directors and of¿cers, and implicitly
contemplate their exposure to third-party tort claims. I suggest that courts
instead focus on whether the pleadings allege that the director or of¿cer
was at fault. In other words, has the plaintiff implicated the defendant
in facts that give rise to a cause of action in tort? This strictly tort-based
analysis is conceptually simpler than a threshold analysis, more consistent
with corporate statutes and Supreme Court precedent, and justi¿able on
policy grounds. Under this approach, I expect that improper personal
claims—such as those that are based solely on the defendant’s status as
a director or of¿cer, inconsistent with the parties’ legitimate expectations,
or in conÀict with statutory obligations and remedies—will continue to
be dismissed. At the same time, when directors and of¿cers misuse the
corporation to harm others, the tort-based analysis will more effectively
promote compensation and accountability.
This discussion will proceed in three parts. First, I review the
conÀicting judgments of the provincial appellate courts in order to explain
the doctrinal challenges relating to the third-party liability of directors and
of¿cers. Second, I present a detailed interpretation of corporate law statutes
and their consideration by the Supreme Court, advancing the proposition
that they do not modify ordinary principles of tort liability. And third, by
10. To my knowledge, Canadian commentators have not analyzed the corporate statutes for a
legislative intention with respect to the third-party tortious liability of directors and of¿cers. However,
this issue is sometimes acknowledged in detailed discussions of their statutory obligations: see
e.g. Darcy L MacPherson, “The Legislature Strikes Back: The Effect of Ontario’s Bill 152 on the
Bene¿ciaries of the Statutory Duty of Care in the Peoples Decision” (2009–10) 47:1 Alta L Rev 37 at
68-69.
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applying a torts-based analysis to the facts of certain cases, I demonstrate
the conceptual simplicity and policy justi¿cation for treating directors and
of¿cers like any other defendant.
I. 7KHVWDWHRIWKHODZ'LYLGHGDQGLQFRQVLVWHQW
One of the most striking features of the Canadian jurisprudence on
third-party liability of directors and of¿cers is the absence of a common
analytical framework grounded in basic principles of civil liability. In my
view, this helps explain the division and confusion about the fundamental
questions raised by these claims, such as the extent to which they implicate
the corporate veil.11 In an effort to resolve the perceived tension between
corporate personality and personal responsibility without an established
reference point, Canadian courts have latched on to a number of different
principles, including identi¿cation theory, tort doctrine, limited liability,
and public policy. Therefore, the muddled state of Canadian law in
this area is not surprising. But as the analysis below indicates, claims
involving pure economic loss have proven especially dif¿cult to resolve,
perhaps because they epitomize the conÀict at the heart of these cases.
Since a corporation is incapable of acting independently, its behaviour is
directed by human agents who are expected to take risks and pursue the
corporation’s best interests, which are in practice de¿ned in commercial
terms. Moreover, the plaintiffs in pure economic loss cases are typically
investors or creditors who voluntarily assumed the risk of dealing with
an incorporated entity, and advancing a personal claim may be viewed as
trying to shift the burden in a way that is inconsistent with the nature of
the original transaction.
The courts’ discomfort with pure economic loss cases may explain the
test that emerged from 6FRWLD0F/HRG,QFY3HRSOHV-HZHOOHUV/WG, which
has proven dif¿cult to apply in a principled manner.12 This was a claim
for negligent misrepresentation brought by unsecured debenture holders,
who alleged that the issuer’s of¿cers failed to properly disclose certain
liabilities that were material to their investment decision. In the course of
his reasons, Finlayson JA implied that there is a distinction between cases
involving “fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or want of authority” on the part of
the director or of¿cer and cases in which other types of wrongdoing is

11. See e.g. 1HLOVHQ(VWDWHY(SWRQ, 2006 ABQB 21 at para 570 (¿nding no conÀict between Business
Corporations Act and personal liability of president for death of employee); 6WUDWD3ODQ1R9,6Y
&DQDQ,QYHVWPHQW*URXSV/WG, 2010 BCCA 329 at para 72 (“Nothing in the pleading indicates why the
corporate veil should be pierced to ¿nd liability on the part of these four individuals.”) [6WUDWD3ODQ].
12. See 6FRWLD0F/HRG,QFY3HRSOHV-HZHOOHUV/WGHWDO (1995), 26 OR (3d) 481, 129 DLR (4th) 711
(CA) [6FRWLD0F/HRGcited to OR].
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alleged.13 He noted that successful claims falling into the latter category are
“rare”, suggesting that directors or of¿cers will usually be held personally
liable only for behaviour that is intentional or egregious.14 Nevertheless,
Finlayson JA did not exclude claims for lesser forms of wrongdoing, but
proposed a rule that presumes limited liability for directors and of¿cers:
Absent allegations that ¿t within the categories described above, of¿cers
or employees of limited companies are protected from personal liability
unless it can be shown that their actions are themselves tortious or exhibit
a separate identity or interest from that of the company so as to make the
act or conduct complained of their own.15

The principle of corporate personality inÀuenced Finlayson JA’s reasoning.
He emphasized the fact that a corporation cannot function without human
agents, so to hold these agents liable simply for acting in a representative
capacity would be problematic. In Finlayson JA’s view, this dilemma called
for some principle to distinguish between the corporation’s behaviour and
that of its agents personally.
He based this principle on identi¿cation theory, which is a criminal
law rule used to attribute the intent of a corporation’s directing minds to
the corporation.16 Finlayson JA articulated the test as follows: “To hold the
directors of Peoples personally liable, there must be some activity on their
part that takes them out of the role of directing minds of the corporation.”17
This adoption of identi¿cation theory in the context of civil claims against
directors and of¿cers is problematic. The original purpose of identi¿cation
theory was to enable corporate criminal responsibility, which is often
stiÀed because the corporation is a legal ¿ction with a dispersed power
structure. In this context, it makes practical sense to use the state of mind
of corporate agents as a proxy for the corporation’s intent or lack thereof.
But, when dealing with a third-party claim against a director or of¿cer, it
is unclear how investigating the corporation would shed light on whether
the impugned behaviour ought to be considered personal. Since the court
cannot ask the corporation about whether its agent’s behaviour aligned
with its wishes, Finlayson JA’s inverse identi¿cation theory will result in
immunity provided the director or of¿cer was acting in the course of his or
her duties and the wrongdoing served a corporate interest.

13. ,ELG at 490-491.
14. ,ELG at 491.
15. ,ELG.
16. See e.g. 5Y&DQDGLDQ'UHGJH 'RFN&R[1985] 1 SCR 662 at paras 31-32, 1 RCS 662.
17. 6FRWLD0F/HRG, VXSUD note 12 at 491.
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Applying this principle to the facts in Lewis discussed earlier, the
president would not have been liable for negligently causing the death
of his employee. The president, as supervisor of the sawmill, ordered
the employee to work under dangerous conditions rather than suspend
operations and install safety equipment. Although shocking by today’s
standards, the president’s actions were plainly intended to maximize pro¿t,
which furthers the commercial interests of the corporation. Therefore, to
use Finlayson JA’s words, the president’s negligence did not “exhibit a
separate identity or interest from that of the company.”18
Admittedly, Finlayson JA may not have envisioned his identi¿cation
test applying to cases involving personal injury, as the case before
him concerned pure economic loss. Moreover, if one reads the “or” as
disjunctive in his statement of principle quoted above, then the presumption
of immunity may also be set aside if the director’s or of¿cer’s “actions
are themselves tortious.” In Lewis, the president’s behaviour was itself
tortious because he was personally implicated in negligence. Despite
being widely followed, the ambiguity of the rule in ScotiaMcLeod has
produced outcomes that are dif¿cult to reconcile on principled grounds
and divergence both between and within provincial courts of appeal.
Aside from its challenging semantics, another questionable aspect of
ScotiaMcLeod is the proposition that directors and of¿cers are presumed to
have limited liability. I address the merits of the claim in Section 2, but for
now I want to emphasize its analytical impact on the cases that followed.
By creating a presumption of immunity from tortious liability, the rule in
ScotiaMcLeod calls for a threshold corporate law analysis to determine
whether a third-party claim against a director or of¿cer should proceed.
Consequently, in the pleadings motions that ensued, the analysis generally
focused on to whom the wrong should be attributed, as opposed to whether
or not it was actionable in tort. As I argue later, the regrettable legacy of
ScotiaMcLeod is the analytical subordination of tort law principles, which
are capable of producing coherent and principled outcomes on their own.
The doctrinal review that follows, which is structured by region, shows
that the same cannot be said for the threshold corporate law analysis
proposed in ScotiaMcLeod.
1. Ontario Court of Appeal
The development of the law in Ontario best demonstrates the challenges
posed by the threshold attribution analysis adopted in ScotiaMcLeod.
Three years after that judgment, Finlayson JA applied the same test in
18.

Ibid at 491.
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Normart Management Ltd v West Hill Redevelopment Co, dismissing an
action for breach of ¿duciary duty and conspiracy against directors of two
corporate parties to a joint venture agreement.19 The object of the joint
venture was to develop land. The plaintiff, who was the third party to the
agreement, alleged that the other two parties were liable for purchasing
the target property through a separate corporation. The plaintiff alleged
that this purchase was made to exclude the target property from the deal.
Finlayson JA observed that the plaintiff was seeking to transform a breach
of contract case into a personal tort claim against the directors, perhaps
to strengthen the likelihood of enforcing any resulting judgment. He
dismissed the personal claims because the allegations did not indicate that
the directors had acted outside their capacity as “directing minds” of the
joint venture parties.20 In so holding, Finlayson JA clearly viewed such
claims to be inconsistent with corporate personality: “To give effect to [the
plaintiff’s] argument simpliciter would eliminate any semblance of the
corporate veil.”21 But less than a year after Normart, the Court of Appeal
took a very different view.
In ADGA Systems International Ltd v Valcom Ltd., the plaintiff sued
the director and two employees of a competitor for raiding personnel that
were key to securing a contract.22 The main cause of action was inducing
breach of contract, and Carthy JA held that the corporation’s separate legal
status did not necessarily bar such a claim against its agents. However, he
noted that for practical purposes an agent cannot be sued for inducing the
corporate principal to breach a contract to which it is a party. This is because
in order to conduct business, the corporation must be capable of breaching
its contracts, but as a legal ¿ction it relies on human agents to authorize such
breaches. Moreover, since those who deal with a corporation knowingly
assume the risk of limited liability, fairness requires that any claim for
breach of contract be con¿ned to the corporation.23 Carthy JA referred to
this breach of contract scenario, which he derived from the English case of
Said v Butt,24 as resulting in “an exception to the general rule that persons
are responsible for their own conduct.”25 But it is questionable whether
there is anything exceptional about the notion that a director or of¿cer
19. See Normart Management Ltd v West Hill Redevelopment Co (1998), 37 OR (3d) 97, 155 DLR
(4th) 627 (CA) [Normart cited to OR].
20. See ibid at 102-03.
21. Ibid at 106.
22. See ADGA Systems International Ltd v Valcom (1999), 43 OR (3d) 101, 168 DLR (4th) 351 (CA)
[ADGA Systems cited to OR].
23. See ibid at 105-106.
24. [1920] 3 KB 497, 90 LJKB 239.
25. ADGA Systems, supra note 22 at 106.
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cannot be sued for effectuating a breach of contract by the corporation
he or she serves. This is because the tort of inducing breach of contract
contemplates a tripartite scenario, in which the defendant induces an
unrelated third party to breach its contract with the plaintiff.26 In a case
like Said v Butt, however, the director is not a stranger to the corporation,
but rather is acting as its agent to breach its contract with the defendant.
As a result, the simpler reading of this scenario is that it does not satisfy
the elements of the tort because the director and the corporation are one
and the same. But these were not the facts in ADGA Systems because the
individual defendants were not related to the contracting party.
Nevertheless, for any other cause of action in tort, Carthy JA held that
“the corporate veil is not threatened and the Salomon principle remains
intact.”27 This is a considerable departure from Finlayson JA’s holdings in
ScotiaMcLeod and Normart, which consider tort claims against directors
and of¿cers to undermine corporate personality. Based on a review of the
authorities, Carthy JA explained the law as follows:
The consistent line of authority in Canada holds simply that, in all
events, of¿cers, directors and employees of corporations are responsible
for their tortious conduct even though that conduct was directed in a
bona ¿de manner to the best interests of the company, always subject to
the Said v Butt exception.28

Carthy JA attempted to reconcile this principle with ScotiaMcLeod by
casting its statement of principle as obiter. He noted that Finlayson JA
ultimately allowed the misrepresentation claim to proceed against the
two individual defendants who were of¿cers of the issuing corporation
and personally involved in the impugned disclosures.29 Carthy JA
acknowledged the risk of encouraging multiple proceedings and suggested
that a policy exception may be justi¿ed in the case of plaintiffs who
voluntarily deal with corporations. But he concluded that the case before
him did not warrant taking this further step because the plaintiff’s claim
was based on intentional wrongdoing of which it had no warning.
For the next decade, the Ontario Court of Appeal followed ADGA
Systems fairly consistently. For example, in NBD Bank, Canada v
Dofasco, Inc et al, it dismissed an appeal of a trial judgment in which
the vice-president of the corporate defendant’s bankrupt subsidiary was
26. See generally Lumley v Gye (1853), 118 ER 749, 1 WR 432 (QB) and Drouillard v Cogeco Cable
Inc, 2007 ONCA 322 at para 26 [Drouillard].
27. ADGA Systems, supra note 22 at 105.
28. Ibid at 107.
29. See ibid at 112.
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found liable for negligent misrepresentation.30 Interestingly, Rosenberg
JA expressly rejected the appellant’s argument, based on ScotiaMcLeod,
that he could not be held liable for actions taken in the interests of the
corporation. Rosenberg JA reasoned that while ScotiaMcLeod suggested
personal liability may be exceptional, it was not excluded provided that the
impugned behaviour was itself tortious. He cited ADGA Systems at length
and concluded: “I can see no basis for protecting [the vice-president]
from liability…simply because he may have been acting in pursuance
of the interests of a corporation.”31 The Court of Appeal also rejected
the appellant’s indeterminate liability argument based on ordinary tort
law principles. Following Hercules Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young,
Rosenberg JA held that indeterminacy concerns were obviated because
the appellant made the misstatements himself for the purpose of securing
the loan, and the bank relied on his statements in deciding to grant it.32 In
another negligent misrepresentation case, the Court of Appeal reversed
the motion judge’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant,
since it was based on the erroneous notion that an of¿cer cannot be held
personally liable for actions taken as part of corporate functions.33
The Court of Appeal also followed ADGA Systems in cases involving
other torts. For example, in Anger v Berkshire Investment Group Inc, the
plaintiffs lost money after making investments based on the supposed
misstatements of company salespeople.34 In addition to suing the
salespeople, the plaintiffs alleged that some of the company’s compliance
personnel, of¿cers, and directors were also liable for negligent supervision
of the salespeople. Following ADGA Systems, the Court of Appeal allowed
the claim to proceed.35 In another case, Unisys Canada, Inc v York Three
Associates, Inc, which involved claims for inducing breach of contract and
intentional interference with economic relations, Finlayson JA intimated
that ScotiaMcLeod did not purport to grant immunity to directors and
of¿cers, but instead required that the facts personally implicate them in
the wrongdoing.36 The problem for the plaintiff in Unisys was that the trial
30. See NBD Bank, Canada v Dofasco, Inc et al (1999), 46 OR (3d) 514, 181 DLR (4th) 37 (CA)
[NBD Bank cited to OR].
31. Ibid at para 44.
32. See ibid at para 59.
33. See Lana International Ltd v Menasco Aerospace Ltd (2000), 50 OR (3d) 97 at para 46, 190 DLR
(4th) 340 (CA).
34. See Anger v Berkshire Investment Group Inc (2001), 141 OAC 301, 102 ACWS (3d) 1067
[Anger cited to OAC].
35. See ibid at para 11: “Recent case law has made it clear that directors, of¿cers and employees of
corporations can be liable for torts they commit personally even if they are acting in the course of their
duties or in accordance with the ‘best interests of the corporation’” (ibid).
36. See Unisys Canada Inc v York Three Associates Inc (2001), 150 OAC 49 at para 11, 44 RPR (3d)
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judge held that the defendant’s conduct did not satisfy the elements of the
alleged torts. Finally, in the employment case of Correia et al v Canac
Kitchens et al, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in
dismissing an action for negligent investigation against the employer’s
head of human resources.37 Citing both ADGA Systems and the Supreme
Court’s judgment in London Drugs v Kuehne & Nagel International
Ltd,38 the Court of Appeal held that “[a]n employee acting in the context
or course of employment can be personally responsible for his or her
tortious conduct.”39 Since the head of human resources was the person
who supposedly misidenti¿ed the plaintiff and reported him to police, she
was personally implicated in the alleged wrongdoing.
Therefore, between 1999 and 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal
addressed third-party claims against corporate agents fairly consistently.40
Regardless of the tort at issue, the Court took the position that directors,
of¿cers, and employees of corporations are personally liable for the
wrongful conduct in which they engage. The only impermissible claims
are those that seek to hold corporate agents personally liable based solely
on their status within the corporation. In other words, such claims are an
attempt to impose vicarious liability on directors and of¿cers, which turns
the nature of the corporation on its head and undermines its independent
legal status. As a result, after ADGA Systems, the nature of the analysis
became more focused on tort law principles, speci¿cally whether the facts
or allegations satisfy the elements of the asserted cause of action vis-à-vis
the defendant personally.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal cast doubt over more than a
decade of doctrinal clarity with its unanimous judgment in Piedra
v Copper Mesa Mining Corp.41 This was one of the early examples of
lawsuits against Canadian mining companies for human rights violations
in which their foreign subsidiaries were implicated. The plaintiffs were
Ecuadorian residents who alleged that two directors of Copper Mesa, a
British Columbia company that controlled a mining project in Ecuador,

138.
37. See Correia et al v Canac Kitchens et al, 2008 ONCA 506 [Canac Kitchens].
38. [1992] 3 SCR 299 at 408, 97 DLR (4th) 261, Iacobucci J, concurring [London Drugs].
39. Canac Kitchens, supra note 37 at para 86.
40. Despite this, after ADGA Systems, lower courts in Ontario continued to struggle with thirdparty claims against corporate agents: see Debenham, supra note 9. Other Court of Appeal decisions
following ADGA Systems during this period include Meditrust Healthcare Inc v Shoppers Drug Mart,
124 OAC 137, 90 ACWS (3d) 690 and Tecnorag Ltd v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 82 ACWS (3d)
884, 1998 CanLII 4387 (Ont CA).
41. 2011 ONCA 191 [Piedra].
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were negligent in failing to prevent acts of violence and threats committed
against them by security forces hired by the operating subsidiary.
Based on the principles that emerged from ADGA Systems, the plaintiffs’
allegations should have survived a motion to dismiss. This is because the
plaintiffs were not alleging that the directors of the parent company were
vicariously liable for the actions of the operating subsidiary, but rather that
they were themselves liable for what happened because the facts gave rise
to an af¿rmative duty on their part to prevent the harm that materialized.
Speci¿cally, the plaintiffs implicated the directors in negligence by alleging
that they: 1) knew or ought to have known, based on various corporate
disclosures and meetings, of the risk that local security forces posed to
opponents of the project; 2) promised not to be part of such activities and
to make further inquiries about the use of security forces on the ground;
3) failed to properly supervise the executive of Copper Mesa; 4) did not
institute corporate policies to prevent abuse, nor did they investigate
earlier reports of violence; 5) approved corporate policies and practices
designed to eliminate opposition to the project; and 6) approved funding
for security forces with a history of violence.42 Despite the personal nature
of these allegations, the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim by reverting
to a radical interpretation of the corporate veil.
Referring to ADGA Systems only to the extent that it quoted
ScotiaMcLeod, the Court of Appeal reproached the plaintiffs for not alleging
that the individual defendants were directly involved in the violence that
took place in Ecuador, or “that they acted contrary to the best interests
of Copper Mesa or outside the scope of their authority as directors.”43
As a result of these supposed de¿ciencies, the Court of Appeal subjected
the plaintiffs’ claims to a “high degree of scrutiny” in order to eliminate
tenuous personal claims that risk discouraging people from serving as
corporate representatives.44 Despite the well-established rule that an act of
omission may give rise to liability in negligence, the Court of Appeal held
that an allegation based on failing to prevent harm is equivalent to holding
directors liable simply because they were directors of Copper Mesa.45
With respect, this does not follow. In the latter case, there is no allegation
of wrongdoing on the part of the director or of¿cer, who is simply added
as a defendant by virtue of his or her position. Whatever the merits of their
allegations, the plaintiffs pleaded facts that implicated the defendants in

42. See ibid at paras 22-26.
43. Ibid at para 74.
44. See ibid at para 75.
45. See ibid at para 84.
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negligence as outlined above. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Piedra
is irreconcilable with the outcomes in Anger and Berger discussed earlier,
both of which involved legitimate negligence claims against corporate
agents for failing to prevent harm to third parties.46
Nevertheless, without citing authority, the Court of Appeal stated
that “[a] corporate director has no established duty in law to be mindful
of the interests of strangers to the corporation when discharging his or
her duties as a director.”47 If by “strangers” the Court of Appeal meant
third parties, then this statement purports to give directors immunity for
torts they commit for the bene¿t of the corporation, which is clearly at
odds with its post-ADGA jurisprudence. Moreover, the basic nature of
tort law and negligence in particular is that liability may arise to those
who were once strangers when the circumstances conspire to make them
neighbours.48 In this sense, the plaintiffs alleged that—by virtue of the
individual defendants’ knowledge of the risk to local villagers, their failure
of be proactive about preventing and responding to abuses by security
forces, and their promise to avoid involvement in the type of wrongdoing
that materialized—there was suf¿cient proximity between the parties
to establish a duty of care. The simplistic notion that the plaintiffs were
strangers to the parent corporation because they were harmed through a
foreign subsidiary was based on inattention to the nature of their claim.
This is incompatible with basic principles of tort law and inconsistent with
corporate statutes as discussed in Section 2.49
Only a year after its problematic judgment in Piedra, the Court of
Appeal reverted back to the ADGA Systems line of authority in Schembri
et al v Way et al.50 This case involved allegations of fraud in the context
of a joint venture agreement between two corporations. The plaintiff was
one of the parties to the agreement and sought to add as a defendant the
employee and director of the other party, who allegedly participated in
diverting money from the joint venture resulting in lost pro¿ts. Quoting
ScotiaMcLeod, the motion judge refused to add the personal claim because
it required “some activity…that takes [the corporate representatives] out
of the role of directing minds of the corporation.”51 Without mentioning
its judgment in Piedra, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding “[t]he fact
46. See Anger, supra note 34, and Berger, supra note 3.
47. Piedra, supra note 41 at para 85.
48. See generally Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562, 1932 SLT 317 (HL).
49. Admittedly, it is possible to read the more problematic aspects of Piedra as obiter because the
Court of Appeal identi¿ed a number of de¿ciencies in the pleadings that cast doubt over the extent of
the directors’ involvement in wrongdoing. See Section 3a below.
50. 2012 ONCA 620.
51. Ibid at para 18, citing ScotiaMcLeod, supra note 12 at 491.
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that [the directing minds of corporations] can be separately liable if they
have engaged in tortious conduct, even in the course of their duty, was also
con¿rmed by this Court in ADGA Systems.”52
The Ontario experience suggests that, despite a period of doctrinal
consistency, lingering uncertainty about the relationship between
corporate personality and personal liability means that the pendulum may
swing in another direction as judges turn over and novel claims arise.
Part of the problem in Ontario is that the Court of Appeal never totally
buried ScotiaMcLeod and its threshold attribution analysis. Even in ADGA
Systems, it cited ScotiaMcLeod’s relevant passage with apparent approval
and legitimized policy concerns about undermining the corporation’s
legal status. In other words, the jurisprudence still suggests that there is
something exceptional about holding directors and of¿cers personally
liable for torts they commit in the name of the corporation.
2. British Columbia Court of Appeal
The experience in British Columbia is similarly inconsistent. For
example, in Hildebrand v Fox, the plaintiff was a teacher who claimed
that she was subject to a wrongful school board investigation.53 She sued
the superintendent for negligence, alleging that the defendant: did not
recognize problems with the investigation; issued a letter of discipline
prematurely; and noti¿ed the College of Teachers before giving her the
chance to respond. Following ADGA Systems and London Drugs, the
Court of Appeal allowed the claim to proceed because it was not convinced
that employees are immune from liability in negligence, even when the
careless act or omission occurred in the context of their duties.54
In Strata Plan VIS3578 v Canan Investment Group Ltd, the Court
of Appeal dismissed claims against directors and of¿cers for negligent
construction because the pleadings did not implicate them personally in
the wrongdoing.55 In other words, rather than describe the role that the
individual defendants played in bringing about the defects, the plaintiffs
simply listed them alongside the corporate defendants and unattributed
allegations. The Court of Appeal recognized that while there is no legal
bar to claims in tort against directors and of¿cers, “the facts giving rise
52. Ibid at para 30.
53. See Hildebrand v Fox, 2008 BCCA 434.
54. See ibid at para 70. The defendant suggested that the Said v Butt “exception” ought to apply
in this case, since his mishandling of the complaint was also a breach of the employment contract
between the plaintiff and the School Board. Recognizing that Said v Butt did not concern a tort at
all, but rather an agent acting on behalf of a principal to terminate a contract, would resolve this
misconception.
55. Strata Plan, supra note 11.
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to personal liability must be speci¿cally pleaded.”56 As stated earlier,
this principle is sound because otherwise directors and of¿cers would
be exposed to liability simply by virtue of their relationship to the
corporation. Allowing such imprecise pleading would undermine both
personal responsibility and corporate personality. Despite reaching the
correct outcome, the Court of Appeal suggested that facts implicating
directors and of¿cers in wrongdoing are necessary to demonstrate
“why the corporate veil should be pierced.”57 Therefore, like its Ontario
counterpart, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia considered that the
tortious liability of directors and of¿cers is exceptional and at odds with
the distinct legal status of the corporation.
However, three years later the Court of Appeal took the position that
the corporate veil was not implicated in these types of claims. In XY, LLC
v Zhu,58 which involved allegations of deceit and conspiracy against the
controlling shareholder and two employees of the corporate defendant, the
Court of Appeal af¿rmed the trial judge’s ¿nding of personal liability. In
doing so, the Court of Appeal cited ADGA Systems and held that, in such
claims, “Salomon is not engaged and the corporate veil is not threatened.”59
But less than a year later, the Court of Appeal reverted to ScotiaMcLeod
in a case involving allegations of defamation against corporate directors.60
In that case, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s dismissal of the
claim because there was no allegation that the defendants were acting other
than in the best interests of the companies they served and no evidence that
their conduct “exhibited a ‘separate identity or interest’” from that of the
companies.61
3. Alberta Court of Appeal
In contrast to Ontario and British Columbia, in Alberta the Court of Appeal
is decidedly uneasy about the personal tortious liability of directors and
of¿cers, particularly with respect to pure economic loss. Two such cases
are noteworthy. In Blacklaws v Morrow,62 the plaintiffs were timeshare
owners who sued the resort’s director for negligence. The plaintiffs
alleged that the director failed to properly maintain the resort, resulting
56. Ibid at para 69.
57. Ibid at para 72.
58. 2013 BCCA 352.
59. Ibid at para 64.
60. See Merit Consultants International Ltd v Chandler, 2014 BCCA 121 [Merit].
61. See ibid at para 24. The outcome in Merit may largely be due to the fact that the action was a
transparent attempt to hold the directors liable for the wrongs of the corporations. The personal claims
were only brought after earlier claims against the corporations were stayed because the corporations
¿led for protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36.
62. 2000 ABCA 175 [Blacklaws].
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in a sewage leak and lengthy shutdown. Consequently, not only could the
plaintiffs not use the resort, but also it was delisted from a network that
allowed them to trade their units for time elsewhere. The trial judge held
the defendant director liable for negligence, but the majority of the Court
of Appeal reversed.
The majority cited 6FRWLD0F/HRG and acknowledged that in some
circumstances a corporate representative may be liable in tort.63 But
the problem in this case was that the plaintiffs’ claim was for pure
economic loss, which the majority suggested generally will not give rise
to personal liability on the part of a corporate representative. Indeed, the
majority emphasized the fact that the resort was owned and operated by
a corporation in ¿nancial dif¿culty. As a result, the majority held that the
only way the director could have satis¿ed his alleged duty to the plaintiffs
was by injecting more of his own money into the corporation to pay for
the sewage system.64 The majority reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim
would have the effect of requiring directors to personally guarantee the
obligations of the corporations they serve.65
Although the majority did not directly address the issue of corporate
personality, it noted a related policy concern. The majority was troubled
by what it saw as the “far-reaching” consequences of such claims on the
incentive to represent and invest in small and risky enterprises.66 I will
return to this argument in Section 3, but for now it is important to point out
that a legitimate tort action against a corporate representative will not seek
to hold him or her vicariously liable for the corporation’s obligations. As
Berger J indicated in dissent, the plaintiffs did not allege that the director
was liable because he refused to pay for the sewage system himself, but
rather that he mismanaged the resort by failing to prioritize the installation
of the sewage system.67 This was a properly framed allegation because
it was based on his own omission, not that of the corporation. More
fundamentally, the negligence analysis is context speci¿c. The standard of
care expected of a corporate representative will depend upon a number of
factors, including the ¿nancial position of the business. If the corporation
cannot satisfy its obligation due to a lack of money, then its agent’s
behaviour will be judged by whether he or she acted reasonably in the
circumstances (e.g., by giving notice, partially satisfying, or pursuing
alternatives). The majority’s inability to make this distinction speaks to
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See LELG at para 41.
See LELG at paras 71-72.
See LELG at paras 49, 71.
See LELG at paras 49, 75.
See LELG at para 161.
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the predominant policy concern about undermining corporate personality,
which can be traced to the ScotiaMcLeod line of cases.68
In Hogarth v Rocky Mountain Slate Inc,69 the majority of the Court of
Appeal took a similar tack. This was a negligent misrepresentation case in
which the plaintiff investors alleged that the defendant of¿cer was personally
liable for their losses because he was involved in promoting the business
opportunity, including the preparation of misleading documents. The
majority cited ScotiaMcLeod and held that the defendant’s representations
were not “independent from his activity as a corporate of¿cer.”70 The
majority went so far as to say that the plaintiffs’ claim sought to impose
personal liability for “carrying out the business of the corporation.”71 In
other words, since the defendant committed the wrongful act in the course
of his duties and for the bene¿t of the corporation, personal liability did
not attach. This is the same problematic reasoning that the Supreme Court
rejected in Lewis nearly a century earlier.
While Slatter JA’s concurring judgment is laudably more nuanced,
it remains imbued with the notion that personal liability undermines
corporate personality. Slatter JA rightfully pointed out that this case, like
Blacklaws, involved allegations of unintentional wrongdoing, resulting in
pure economic loss incurred by plaintiffs who voluntarily assumed the risk
of investing in a business with limited liability.72 According to Slatter JA,
these features distinguish cases like this one from ADGA Systems, which
concerned intentional wrongdoing committed against strangers to the
corporation.73 Slatter JA also reasoned that since the corporation’s separate
legal status is recognized by statute, it must be capable of being directly
liable in tort, as opposed to merely vicariously liable for the wrongdoing
of its agents.74 Accordingly, in misrepresentation cases such as this one,
which involve plaintiffs who knowingly deal with a corporation, Slatter JA
proposed that there should be a presumption that the corporation, and not
its agent, would be liable.75

68. The same concern is reÀected in another case, Ahmad v Athabasca Tribal Council Ltd, 2010
ABCA 341, in which the Court of Appeal held that a corporate representative is only liable in tort if he
or she “was acting outside his or her duties as director or to further personal interests over that of the
corporation” (ibid at para 25).
69. 2013 ABCA 57 [Hogarth].
70. Ibid at paras 13-14.
71. Ibid at para 14.
72. See ibid at para 72.
73. See ibid at para 102.
74. See ibid at para 113.
75. See ibid at para 115.
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Nevertheless, Slatter JA conducted a duty of care analysis, focusing on
the reasonable reliance and expectations of the parties in the circumstances.
In particular, he held that when dealing with personal claims arising
in the corporate context, courts should consider whether personal or
corporate liability was more reasonable to rely upon and expect in the
circumstances.76 In other words, according to this approach, reasonable
expectations about corporate structure and corporate personality ought to
inform the proximity analysis. The problem for the plaintiffs in this case
was that they knowingly dealt with a corporation and did not speci¿cally
rely on the of¿cer’s personal involvement in promoting the venture. In fact,
at the time of the investment, the plaintiffs did not know which corporate
representative had prepared the impugned statements.77 But Slatter JA
went on to look at whether any prima facie duty of care would have been
limited or negated by residual policy considerations. Speci¿cally, he held
that even when personal liability is reasonably relied upon and expected,
it can nevertheless be rejected based on the imperative of protecting
corporate personality:
[T]here is nothing illegitimate about using limited liability business
structures, and imposing a duty that undermines the viability of that
structure is a legitimate policy concern …. Holding an individual liable
for a tort committed directly in pursuit of the company’s business
amounts to requiring that individual to grant a personal guarantee for the
tort liabilities of the company.78

As other commentators have noted, the innovative feature of Slatter JA’s
approach is that it tries to reconcile the analysis of corporate torts with
general tort law principles.79 But it continues to view the corporate form
as extending at least some degree of limited liability to corporate agents.
Slatter JA merely shifted the threshold analysis in 6FRWLD0F/HRG to a policybased backstop against personal liability. Even more problematic is Slatter

76. See LELG at para 121.
77. See LELG.
78. ,ELG at para 125-126.
79. See Shannon O’Byrne, Yemi Philip & Katherine Fraser, “The Tortious Liability of Directors
and Of¿cers to Third Parties in Common Law Canada” (2017) 54:4 Alta L Rev 871. Interestingly,
in the recent case of in +DOO Y 6WHZDUW, 2019 ABCA 98, the Court of Appeal applied Slatter JA’s
analysis to impose liability on the director of a construction company who negligently installed a
staircase that collapsed, injuring workers on the construction site. The Court of Appeal’s judgment
signals that outcomes may depend on the nature of the damage at issue. The Court held that,
“[a]lthough the respondent’s tort was not at all ‘independent’ of the corporation DWS Construction,
the modern corporation was not designed to be a method of providing immunity to corporate actors for
this sort of loss. There are strong public policy reasons to ensure that physically injured plaintiffs are
compensated. Claims for pure economic loss raise different issues” (LELGat para 23).
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JA’s implicit recognition, in the above-quoted passage, that businesspeople
may legitimately commit torts in the interests of a corporation. Aside
from undermining personal responsibility, this approach invites judges to
expand the scope of limited liability in a way that is inconsistent with
Canada’s corporate law statutes. As detailed in the next section, resolving
the confusion in this fundamental area of law will require close attention
to what the legislator intended.
II. Personal liability is consistent with corporate law statutes
Does the fact that “[a] corporation has the capacity and…the rights,
powers and privileges of a natural person” mean that it generally bears
responsibility for torts committed in the course of its business?80 In other
words, in granting legal personality to the corporation, did the legislator
also intend to grant limited liability to its directors and of¿cers? While other
commentators have referred to the corporation’s historical development
and early cases to answer this question, my focus here is on the text of this
country’s current corporate law statutes, as exempli¿ed by the Canada
Business Corporations Act (CBCA).81 A careful reading of its provisions
indicates that the legislator has not exempted directors and of¿cers from
third-party liability in tort.
To begin with, the only CBCA provision that expressly confers
immunity from civil liability is s. 45(1), which states that “shareholders
of a corporation are not, as shareholders, liable for any liability, act or
default of the corporation.”82 While s. 45(1) is broad enough to encompass
tortious liability, it refers to shareholders only and there are no equivalent
provisions dealing with directors or of¿cers. Moreover, s. 45(1) stresses
that immunity applies only when shareholders are acting as such (i.e., as
passive investors), which suggests that immunity will be lost when they
incur liabilities through more active participation in the business. The
existence of s. 45(1) also suggests that limited liability cannot be inferred
from the establishment of corporate personality in s. 15(1).83 The view that
corporate personality necessarily implies limited liability for corporate
participants makes s. 45(1) redundant and thus violates the rule against
tautology.84 In addition, since the common law may only be set aside by
express statutory language, any suggestion that the legislator implicitly
80. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 15(1) [CBCA].
81. See e.g. Flannigan, supra note 9.
82. CBCA, supra note 80 [emphasis added]. The equivalent provisions in Ontario, British Columbia,
and Alberta are: Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16, s 92(1) [OBCA]; Business Corporations
Act, SBC 2002, c 57, s 87 [BCBCA]; Business Corporations Act, RSA 2000, c B-9, s 46(1) [ABCA].
83. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 15; BCBCA, supra note 82, s 30; ABCA, supra note 82, s 16(1).
84. See Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 167.
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gave tort immunity to directors and of¿cers is invalid.85 On this basis alone
it may be argued that the legislator’s silence on tortious liability of directors
and of¿cers means that corporate law leaves the ordinary principles and
obligations in place.
Of course, various CBCA provisions suggest that corporate agents are
not liable for the corporation’s contracts. Section 14, for example, which
imposes personal liability for pre-incorporation contracts, necessarily
implies that there is no such liability for post-incorporation contracts.86
This is followed immediately by the corporate personality provision,
the practical result of which is that corporations contract in their own
name. Privity of contract would thus exclude liability on the part of their
directors and of¿cers. In addition, the indoor management rule, which is
codi¿ed by s. 18 and creates a presumption that the corporation’s agents
have the authority to bind it, indicates that corporate liability for contracts
is the norm.87 This explains the need for s. 119, which makes directors
liable for up to six months of an employee’s unpaid wages—a contractual
obligation that would otherwise be the corporation’s alone.88 The point is
that the legislator expected corporations to assume contractual liabilities
and identi¿ed exceptions to this norm.89
The indemni¿cation provisions of the CBCA suggest that the legislator
did not have the same expectation for other types of legal obligations,
including those in tort. Speci¿cally, s. 124 allows, and in some cases
requires, the corporation to indemnify directors and of¿cers for the costs
of legal proceedings that pertain to their involvement in the corporation.
Importantly, this section deals separately with indemni¿cation in “any
civil, criminal, administrative, investigative, or other proceeding[s]”
85. See ibid at 244–245; United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004
SCC 19 at para 11.
86. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 21(1); BCBCA, supra note 82, s 20(2)(b); ABCA, supra note 82,
s 15(2)(b).
87. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 19; BCBCA, supra note 82, s 146; ABCA, supra note 82, s 19.
88. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 131(1) and ABCA, supra note 82, s 119(1). In British Columbia,
the personal liability of directors and of¿cers for unpaid wages is provided by the Employment
Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 96(1).
89. It may be argued that if directors are liable in tort, then unpaid employees would have a cause
of action against them, even in the absence of s 119, if the corporation’s default was attributable to
negligent management. This is very unlikely because the employees’ tort claim would have to be for
pure economic loss outside of the established categories of cases in which such recovery is possible:
see Martel Building Ltd v Canada, 2000 SCC 60 at para 38. Even if a court were inclined to go beyond
the categories, it would likely still dismiss such a claim for lack of proximity between the unpaid
employees and the allegedly negligent directors. This is because the essence of the relationship at issue
is a contractual one to which the directors are strangers. And at the residual policy stage of the duty
of care analysis, a court would likely reject a duty of care because the employees have an alternative
remedy and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.
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and indemni¿cation in derivative actions.90 This begs the question: if
the legislator intended for corporate personality to exclude third-party
liability of directors and of¿cers, why was an indemni¿cation provision
that captures non-derivative civil proceedings included? Similarly, if the
legislator intended the statutory duty to the corporation to trump ordinary
tort law obligations, why allow for indemni¿cation of the latter?
It may be argued that the legislator simply expected directors and
of¿cers to be exposed to many different kinds of proceedings, which
inevitably impose costs regardless of outcome. In other words, the inclusion
of a broad indemni¿cation provision does not say anything about whether
directors and of¿cers are actually liable to third parties in tort. However,
this argument is inconsistent with the parameters that s. 124 places on
indemni¿cation. Speci¿cally, s. 124(1) expressly includes indemni¿cation
for “an amount paid to…satisfy a judgment.”91 In addition, s. 124(3)
prohibits indemni¿cation if the director or of¿cer breached the ¿duciary
duty to the corporation and, in the context of a criminal or quasi-criminal
proceeding, should have known that his or her conduct was unlawful.92
And s. 124(5) says that the director or of¿cer is entitled to indemni¿cation
if the proceeding concludes without a ¿nding of wrongdoing and he or
she complied with s. 124(3).93 Although not expressly stated, in between
these two scenarios is one in which the director or of¿cer is found to have
engaged in wrongdoing. In this case, indemni¿cation is at the discretion of
the corporation pursuant to s. 124(1). As a result, the text and logic of the
CBCA’s indemni¿cation provisions indicates that the legislator expected
directors and of¿cers to be found civilly liable, not simply made to endure
the cost of meritless civil proceedings.
Next, s. 122(1) is particularly important to this discussion, since it
purportedly codi¿es the “duties of care of directors and of¿cers.”94 But
the legislative history of this provision indicates that it pertains instead to
the standards of conduct that directors and of¿cers owe to the corporation.
According to the Report of the Dickerson Committee, which produced a
90. See CBCA, supra note 80, s 124(1), (4). See also OBCA, supra note 82, ss 136(1), 136(4.1);
BCBCA, supra note 82, ss 160(a), 163(2) (prohibiting indemni¿cation for derivative actions); ABCA,
supra note 82, ss 124(1), 124(2) (requiring leave of the court to provide indemnity for derivative
actions).
91. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 136(1); BCBCA, supra note 82, s 159 (de¿nition of “eligible
penalty”), 160(a); ABCA, supra note 82, s 124(1).
92. See also OBCA, supra note 82, 136(3); BCBCA, supra note 82, s 163(1)(c); ABCA, supra note
82, s 124(1)(a).
93. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 136(4.2); BCBCA, supra note 82, s 161; ABCA, supra note 82,
s 124(3).
94. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 134(1); BCBCA, supra note 82, s 142(1); ABCA, supra note 82,
s 122(1).
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model statute that was the basis of the CBCA, this section was meant to be
“a general statutory formulation of the principles underlying the ¿duciary
relationship between corporations and their directors.”95 With respect to
paragraph (b), the Committee explained that its purpose was to upgrade
the subjective common law standard of care that applied to directors and
of¿cers.
Admittedly, this is not exactly how the Supreme Court explained
s. 122(1) of the CBCA in its two leading judgments on the matter.96 It
described this subsection as codifying duties, rather than standards of
conduct, speci¿cally the ¿duciary duty, which is owed to the corporation,
and the duty of care, which extends beyond the corporation.97 Even so, the
Supreme Court clearly stated in both cases that whether or not a director or
of¿cer owes a duty of care to a given third party is determined by ordinary
principles of civil liability.98 The statute merely informs the applicable
standard of care.99 As a result, although the Court’s description of s. 122(1)
(b) could have been more precise, when viewed as a whole its reasoning is
consistent with the scheme of the Act, which does not grant immunity to
directors and of¿cers.
Does the fact that s. 122(1) concerns the duties that directors and
of¿cers owe to the corporation mean that it excludes their personal liability
to others? In my view, it does not. First, this interpretation would be dif¿cult
to reconcile with the fact that the CBCA speaks expressly to shareholders’
immunity, but is silent on the matter with respect to directors and of¿cers.
The indemni¿cation provisions are also more consistent with personal
liability. Indeed, the fact that the legislator allowed for indemni¿cation
may indicate that this is its preferred mechanism for resolving tensions
between the ¿duciary duty and third-party obligations. Speci¿cally, it
allows the third party to be compensated for wrongdoing, while ensuring
that the director or of¿cer does not pay for something done to bene¿t
the company. This is consistent with indemni¿cation being conditional
upon the directors or of¿cers having “acted honestly and in good faith
with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”100 Second, granting
immunity from civil liability is a radical change to the common law; the

95. See Robert WV Dickerson, John L Howard & Leon Getz, Proposals for a New Business
Corporations Law for Canada, vol 2 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
96. See Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples]; and BCE Inc v
1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 [BCE].
97. See Peoples, supra note 96 at para 57; BCE, supra note 96 at para 36.
98. See Peoples, supra note 96 at para 54; BCE, supra note 96 at para 44.
99. See BCE, supra note 96.
100. CBCA, supra note 80, s 124(3).
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kind of change that generally requires express statutory language, which s.
122(1) does not contain.101
Finally, there is no conÀict between statutory corporate law remedies
and third-party liability of directors and of¿cers in tort. Section 238 of
the CBCA de¿nes “action [as] an action under this Act” for purposes of
both the derivate action and oppression remedy.102 But, as the Supreme
Court held in Peoples Department Stores Inc v Wise, third parties who
allege that a director or of¿cer breached a civil obligation owed to them
personally must sue in tort.103 Therefore, this type of claim is not “an action
under this Act” and does not conÀict with either of the principal statutory
remedies. Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders, the oppression remedy exists to protect the reasonable
expectations of corporate stakeholders, not to enforce legal rights and
obligations that may be the subject of a civil or derivative action.104 This
is evident from the sweeping powers of the court under s. 241(3), which,
among other things, allow it to intrude into the corporation’s governance.
Since the oppression remedy does not cover the same ground as an ordinary
civil action, there is no conÀict between the two procedures.
To summarize the role of the corporate statutes, they are consistent
with the principle that directors and of¿cers are liable to third parties for
torts they commit in the course of their duties. In contrast to shareholders,
there is nothing in the statutes to suggest that the legislator intended to
confer immunity upon directors and of¿cers. Quite to the contrary, the
indemni¿cation provisions indicate that third-party liability was actually
contemplated. Moreover, third-party liability is consistent with the
statutory duty of directors and of¿cers to the corporation. This is because
the source of such liability is the common law, as opposed to the statute.
Likewise, since the statutory remedies exist to vindicate statutory wrongs,
there is no conÀict between them and a civil action in tort brought against
directors and of¿cers. This interpretation also accords with the Supreme
Court’s leading corporate law judgments.

101. Incidentally, this is also why the fact that some provinces specify that the statutory duty of care
is owed to the corporation makes no difference to third-party liability. It merely con¿rms that directors
and of¿cers owe a duty of care to the corporation, but it does not exclude their common law duties to
others: see e.g. OBCA, supra note 82, s 134(1).
102. See also OBCA, supra note 82, s 245; BCBCA, supra note 82, s 235; ABCA, supra note 82, s 239
(although the de¿nition of “action” in the ABCA includes an action “under any other law,” there is no
indication that this was intended to supersede civil claims in tort).
103. See Peoples, supra note 96.
104. See BCE, supra note 96 at para 61; Paul L Davies, Sarah Worthington & Laurence C Bartlett,
Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at
725.
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III. Basic tort law principles are suf¿cient to resolve third-party claims
In the absence of a statutory basis for exceptional treatment of directors
and of¿cers, what basic principles ought to guide the analysis of their
tortious liability to third parties? In my view, the answer is ordinary
common law principles, which have not been expressly ousted by
corporate statute. In particular, a useful starting point is agency theory and
the notion that directors, of¿cers, and employees are simply agents of a
corporate principal. This principal-agent construct has the virtue of being
completely consistent with the distinct legal status of the corporation,
while offering established rules for resolving the tortious liability of those
acting in a representative capacity. In such a scenario, the general rule is
that the agent is always liable for his or her torts, but the principal is only
vicariously liable to the extent that the agent’s wrongdoing happened in the
course of the agency.105 In other words, the fact that a tortfeasor acts in a
representative capacity does not result in immunity.106 Instead, the analysis
focuses on whether the agent’s wrongdoing is suf¿ciently connected to his
or her appointment to make the principal liable as well.
Why should the analysis be any different when the principal is a
corporation? Since principals and agents are always legally distinct, there
is nothing special about the corporation’s legal status. In addition, the same
policy concerns that supposedly arise in the corporate context are equally
present in any principal-agent scenario. For example, why would a person
ever agree to work in airport maintenance if his failure to properly mark an
obstacle on the runway resulted in personal liability for a plane crash?107
In this example, the worker’s omission arises in the context of his service
to the airport, which everyone expects to be responsible for runway safety.
Therefore, personal liability would mean that the worker is guaranteeing
the obligations of the airport. The point is that, in the absence of a statutory
provision that extends limited liability to directors and of¿cers, there is no
basis in law or policy to treat them any differently than others who act in
a representative capacity. The well-trodden rules of agency law should be
the starting point for the analysis.108
In addition to being consistent with basic principles of civil liability,
this approach avoids creating a class distinction between executives and
105. See generally TG Bright & Co v Kerr, [1939] SCR 63 at 70, [1939] 1 DLR 193, Duff CJ,
dissenting; Gerald HL Fridman, Canadian Agency Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) at 225.
106. See Grossman v Canada, [1952] 1 SCR 571 at 603, [1952] 2 DLR 241, Taschereau J.
107. See ibid. Although the plaintiff sued the operator of the airport, as opposed to the airport worker
personally, the agency law principles applied by the Supreme Court left the worker’s personal liability
undisturbed.
108. See Flannigan, supra note 9.
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employees. In /RQGRQ 'UXJV, Iacobucci J held that, depending on the
circumstances, employees may owe a duty of care to those who transact
with their employer:
[T]here is no general rule in Canada to the effect that an employee acting
in the course of his or her employment and performing the ‘very essence’
of his or her employer’s contractual obligations with a customer does not
owe a duty of care, whether one labels it independent or otherwise, to the
employer’s customer.109

Although this case focused on property damage arising out of a contractual
obligation, Iacobucci J’s statement of principle has broader implications. It
suggests that employees may be held liable in tort even if their wrongdoing
occurred in the course of their employment and even if it resulted from
acts done in the employer’s interests. Incidentally, this rule is consistent
with the way agency theory is applied in the employment context.110 So the
problem with cases like 6FRWLD0F/HRG, 3LHGUD, and %ODFNODZV (discussed
previously), is that they view the representative capacity of directors and
of¿cers as presumptively shielding them from liability, which is reasoning
that the Supreme Court rejected in the context of ordinary employees.
This distinction is hard to justify. It may be argued that since directors
and of¿cers are merely responsible for setting corporate policy and usually
do not engage in the types of operational activities that cause harm to third
parties, a presumption against personal liability is appropriate. However,
this point of view fails to acknowledge that corporate policy may itself be
tortious. In the infamous case of the Ford Pinto, the decision to go ahead
with production without ¿xing a dangerous defect in the model’s fuel
system was made by the company’s of¿cers as a matter of policy.111 The
Court of Appeal held that this decision to consciously disregard passenger
safety for ¿nancial reasons amounted to “corporate malice” and justi¿ed
punitive damages.112 If corporate policy may result in tortious liability,
then there needs to be a good reason for presumptively immunizing those
who make it.
As explained above, there is no statutory basis for such exceptional
treatment. From a policy standpoint, personal liability arguably promotes
deterrence better than corporate liability because it places the burden on
those who commit tortious acts. Moreover, as the case law suggests, the
extent to which directors and of¿cers are involved in operations depends
109.
110.
111.
112.

/RQGRQ'UXJVVXSUD note 38 at 408.
See 2QWDULR/WGY6DJD],QGXVWULHV&DQDGD,QF, 2001 SCC 59 at para 31.
See *ULPVKDZY)RUG0RWRU&RPSDQ\(1981), 119 Cal App (3d) 757 at 814, 174 Cal Raptr 348.
,ELG.
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less on their title and more on the nature of the business and the factual
circumstances of the case. Thus, the risk of a presumption against personal
liability is that the outcome will be based on how the corporate defendant
chose to describe its agents, as opposed to the whether they were at fault.
The fact that directors and of¿cers may also be employees of the corporation
makes it dif¿cult to compartmentalize the analysis in any principled way.
But regardless of whether their actions are considered policy-related or
operational, there is no real need to treat directors and of¿cers differently
because ordinary tort law principles will not hold them liable simply by
virtue of their positions, i.e., in the absence of fault. As detailed below,
if the pleadings do not allege that the director or of¿cer committed all
the elements of a cause of action, then the claim will be struck. For this
reason, a presumption against liability or a threshold attribution analysis
is unnecessary and risks undermining the objectives of compensation and
deterrence.
What would it look like if courts shed all presumptions and threshold
tests in favour of a strictly tort-based analysis? In the rest of this section, I
assess the elements of several causes of action in the context of third-party
claims against directors and of¿cers and identify some guiding principles,
which I then use to reconsider some of the more contentious cases discussed
above. I also address the business judgment rule and explain why it is not
inconsistent with a tort-based approach to third-party liability.
2. 1HJOLJHQFH
In negligence cases, the starting point is whether the director or of¿cer
had a duty of care to the third party. Speci¿cally, the court would have to
determine whether the relationship between the parties was suf¿ciently
proximate and whether a risk of harm to the defendant was reasonably
foreseeable.113 In assessing proximity, the court would consider a number
of factors, including expectations, representations, reliance, and interests at
stake.114 In doing so, courts would be advised to avoid using the proximity
factors to engage in an attribution analysis or assignment of liability
exercise, as Slatter JA proposed in +RJDUWK and other commentators
have endorsed.115 However, as Iacobucci J suggested in /RQGRQ 'UXJV,
the proximity analysis is meant to shed light on the nature of the parties’
relationship and whether it supports a duty of care, not to resolve issues
akin to whether corporate or personal liability is more appropriate.116 In
113.
114.
115.
116.

See generally &KLOGVY'HVRUPHDX[, 2006 SCC 18 at para 12.
See &RRSHUY+REDUW, 2001 SCC 79 at para 34 [&RRSHU].
See +RJDUWK, VXSUD note 69 at paras 22-23.
See /RQGRQ'UXJV, VXSUD note 38 at 407.
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'HORLWWH  7RXFKH Y /LYHQW, Brown J explained that such “normative”
concerns are “external” to the parties and thus are best reserved for the
residual policy stage of the duty of care analysis.117
For example, the fact that a plaintiff knowingly dealt with a corporation
on behalf of which the defendant was acting does not mean that the latter did
not owe the former a duty of care. If it were otherwise, then the defendant
in %HUJHU would not have owed his employee a duty of care to ensure the
safety of the workplace.118 This is because the employee knew she worked
for a corporation and the defendant’s failure to ensure that the walkway
was cleared of ice fell within his capacity as president. But this did not
change the fact that the plaintiff expected and relied on the defendant to
do his job, and the defendant knew or ought to have known about the state
of the walkway and the risk of injury it posed. In other words, focusing on
the corporate form at the proximity stage risks obscuring the true nature of
the relationship between the parties.
It is far from obvious that concerns about undermining limited liability
and corporate personality or discouraging people from becoming directors
and of¿cers would negate the duty of care at the residual policy stage.
As explained in Section 2, corporate law statutes do not grant immunity
to directors and of¿cers. Furthermore, the indemni¿cation provisions
implicitly contemplate their tortious liability to third parties, while
providing a tool to mitigate the chill that may come from this exposure.
Since corporations are creatures of statute, judges must respect the will of
the legislature and resist the urge to make policy that goes in a different
direction. But even if one accepts that the protection of corporate personality
is a relevant consideration, it is certainly not the only one. There are the
obvious countervailing interests of promoting personal accountability and
compensation for wrongdoing. There are also legitimate corporate law
arguments in favour of personal liability, including preventing shareholders
from ultimately paying for wrongdoing that they neither participated in nor
anticipated. Moreover, when directors and of¿cers expose the corporation
to losses through tortious conduct, they arguably implicate their statutory
duties to the corporation. Therefore, contrary to the suggestion of Slatter
JA in +RJDUWK, corporate law values do not weigh on only one side of the
policy debate. The inÀuence that they ought to have is inconclusive and
speculative at best, which makes it hard to justify negating a prima facie
duty of care.119
117. 'HORLWWH 7RXFKHY/LYHQW,QF 5HFHLYHURI , 2017 SCC 63 at para 40 [/LYHQW].
118. See %HUJHU, VXSUD note 3.
119. See Solomon et al, &DVHVDQG0DWHULDOVRQWKH/DZRI7RUWV, 9th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2015):
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Another policy reason often raised to deny personal liability is
indeterminacy. Nevertheless, courts must remember that liability is not
indeterminate just because the quantum is signi¿cant or the victims are
many.120 In order to qualify as indeterminate, it must be impossible for
the defendant to ascertain his or her exposure and plan accordingly. For
example, it may be argued that a generic claim for “negligent running
of the business” that indirectly resulted in harm to a third party, or one
that seeks to hold directors collectively liable for the wrongdoing of the
corporation, gives rise to indeterminacy. While this may be true, such
claims are very unlikely to even make it to the residual policy stage of
the duty of care analysis. This is because the plaintiff must ¿rst show that
the relationship between the parties is suf¿ciently proximate, as would be
the case if the plaintiff had personal dealings with the director or of¿cer
that are the basis of the claim. In other words, the proximity between the
parties serves to de¿ne the defendant’s exposure.121
However, this is not to say that the residual policy stage will never
result in setting aside a corporate representative’s prima facie duty of
care to a third party. Speci¿cally, there may be circumstances in which
recognizing a duty of care to a third party would conÀict with the director’s
or of¿cer’s ¿duciary duty to the corporation or be unnecessary due to
the existence of an alternative and more appropriate remedy, such as an
action for oppression under the corporate statute. For example, a group of
bondholders sues the company’s directors for recommending shareholder
approval of a transaction that, while in the best interests of the company,
caused the value of their bonds to drop. In these circumstances, the court
would properly hold that recognizing a duty of care is irreconcilable with
the director’s ¿duciary duty to the corporation. Similarly, the availability
of the oppression remedy, which is sensitive to the conÀicting interests
involved in corporate decision-making, would be viewed as the more
appropriate remedy.122
Therefore, when dealing with third-party negligence claims against
directors or of¿cers, the duty of care analysis will focus primarily on
the relationship between the parties. Speci¿cally, in most cases the
outcome will turn on the relevant proximity factors, namely the parties’

“[G]iven that these policy considerations may deny compensation to an otherwise deserving plaintiff,
they should not determine the matter if they are merely speculative” (LELG at 324).
120. See generally /LYHQW, VXSUD note 117 at para 43.
121. See LELG at para 44; 6DGGDWLY0RRUHKHDG, 2017 SCC 28 at para 34.
122. See %&(, VXSUDnote 96 at paras 36, 45.
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expectations, representations and reliance, the types of interests involved,
and any statute or contract that de¿nes their relationship.123
To illustrate this, let us reconsider the allegations in 3LHGUD from a
strictly tort law perspective. Recall that in this case the Ontario Court
of Appeal dismissed a negligence action against directors of a Canadian
mining company, ostensibly because they were acting in the course of
their duties.124 But, although the plaintiffs made several allegations that
were arguably capable of establishing proximity, a close reading of the
statement of claim uncovers several gaps and inconsistencies. In particular,
the defendants’ knowledge of the risk and commitment to avoid it was
based on a meeting in April 2007, yet the violence upon which the claim
was based occurred in December 2006. In addition, the security forces
were hired before the defendants joined the board and the violence took
place before one of them became a director.125 As a result, the link between
the directors, the risk environment, and the harm suffered by the plaintiffs
was certainly questionable. The point is that the Court of Appeal did not
need to rely on a problematic attribution analysis to dismiss the claim.
2. 1HJOLJHQWPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
As the Supreme Court recently clari¿ed in /LYHQW, the linchpin of the
duty of care analysis in negligent misrepresentation cases is whether the
relationship between the parties was suf¿ciently proximate.126 Brown J
held that “[w]here the defendant undertakes to provide a representation
…in circumstances that invite the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance, the
defendant becomes obligated to take reasonable care.”127 Brown J indicated
that the assessment of the relationship includes the factors raised in
+HUFXOHV, namely whether the defendant knew the identity of the plaintiff
and whether the plaintiff relied on the representations for the purpose for
which defendant made them.128
What do these principles tell us about claims against directors and
of¿cers? First, the plaintiff must allege that the director or of¿cer, as
opposed to the corporation, was the source of the misrepresentation. The
notion of an “undertaking” suggests the director’s or of¿cer’s personal
commitment to and involvement in the representation. Second, the
director’s or of¿cer’s misrepresentation must have arisen in the context of
his or her dealings with the plaintiff. If the parties did not know each other
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See &RRSHU, VXSUD note 114.
See 3LHGUD, VXSUD note 41.
See LELG, at paras 87-91.
See /LYHQW, VXSUD note 117 at para 30.
,ELG.
See LELG at paras 21, 39.
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and never communicated about the transaction in question, then there is
no personal relationship of proximity. In these circumstances, the relevant
relationship is the one between the corporation and the plaintiff. As a
result, the fact that the director or of¿cer merely authorized an inaccurate
statement or disclosure will not be actionable at common law. Third,
the context in which the director or of¿cer made the statement must be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s reliance. For
example, there is a difference between an optimistic statement about the
business’s overall outlook made at an annual meeting and one touting the
merits of a particular opportunity to a prospective investor. And fourth,
a relationship of proximity and the existence of a duty of care are not
suf¿cient to establish the director’s or of¿cer’s personal liability; all of
the elements of the cause of action must be present as well. Speci¿cally,
the misrepresentation must also have been made carelessly, the plaintiff
must have reasonably relied upon it, and such reliance must have been
detrimental, meaning that damages resulted.129 Therefore, personal liability
does not attach to every untrue statement of a corporate representative.
These four principles reconcile the outcomes of the negligent
misrepresentation cases discussed in Section 1. In ScotiaMcLeod,
Finlayson JA did not dismiss claims against the two of¿cers who allegedly
downplayed the company’s liabilities in due diligence meetings with the
plaintiffs surrounding their intended purchase of unsecured debentures.130
Likewise, in NBD Bank, Rosenberg JA af¿rmed the judgment against the
vice-president because he made a number of inaccurate statements about
the company’s assets and outlook during a telephone conversation with
a bank of¿cial. Even though he had reason to doubt their accuracy, the
vice-president made the statements to ensure that the bank maintained the
company’s credit facility loan, on which it ultimately defaulted. The bank
sought to recover its losses for this transaction. And in Hogarth, while
Slatter JA’s analysis focused on the lack of proximity for policy reasons,
he also found that two of the statements in the allegedly misleading
promotional documents prepared by the defendant of¿cer were not
misrepresentations, and that the plaintiff had not established causation
with respect to the third.131
129. See Sharbern Holding Inc v Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd, 2011 SCC 23 at para 121, citing
Queen v Cognos, [1993] 1 SCR 87 at 110, 99 DLR (4th) 626.
130. But see Edgeworth Construction Ltd v ND Lea & Associates Ltd, [1993] 3 SCR 206 at 222, 107
DLR (4th) 169, MacLachlin J (as she was then), dismissed a claim for negligent misrepresentation
against the individual engineers of an engineering ¿rm. Other than af¿xing their seals to a report, there
were no dealings between the individual engineers and the plaintiff.
131. See Hogarth, supra note 69 at para 62.
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Consequently, in most factual scenarios, a threshold attribution or
corporate policy analysis is unnecessary and complicated. The real threat
to corporate personality comes from personal claims based on little more
than the director’s or of¿cer’s position. These claims seek to hold corporate
representatives vicariously liable for the corporation’s wrongdoing. But
ordinary tort law principles are suf¿cient to weed out these claims because
they focus the court’s attention on whether the director or of¿cer was at
fault, i.e., whether he or she committed the elements of a cause of action in
tort. In the absence of fault, there will be no personal liability.
3. Intentional torts
The courts have had less dif¿culty with third-party claims that allege
intentional wrongdoing on the part of directors and of¿cers. For example,
in Said v Butt, McCardie J af¿rmed “the rule that a director or a servant
who actually takes part in or actually authorizes such torts as assault,
trespass to property, nuisance, or the like may be liable in damages.”132 In
ScotiaMcLeod, Finlayson JA quali¿ed his observation that personal tort
liability is “rare” by suggesting that it is more common in cases involving
“fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or want of authority.”133 Nevertheless, if
construed too broadly, the principles governing the category of intentional
wrongs known as “economic torts” may discourage aggressive competition,
which the market fosters among business leaders.134
The courts have been alive to this risk for over a century, resulting in
causes of action that are narrowly de¿ned and allegations that are closely
scrutinized. For example, the Supreme Court recently addressed the scope
of intentional interference with economic relations, a three-way tort in
which the defendant uses “unlawful means” against a third party in order
to prevent it from dealing with the plaintiff.135 The prototypical example
is a trading vessel that ¿res its canon at a canoe in order to prevent it
from reaching and dealing with a competitor trading vessel.136 Cromwell J
limited this tort to circumstances in which the wrongful act would ground a
civil action by the third party.137 Thus, in order for such a claim to succeed
against a corporate representative, the plaintiff would have to show that
he or she perpetrated a separate civil wrong against someone else with the
intention of harming the plaintiff. These instances will be rare.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Said v Butt, supra note 24 at 506.
ScotiaMcLeod, supra note 12 at 492.
See generally Solomon, supra note 119 at 1021.
See AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd, 2014 SCC 12.
See ibid at para 24, citing Tarleton v M’Gawley (1793), Peake 270, 170 ER 153.
See ibid at para 86.
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Likewise, inducing breach of contract will generally not pose a
problem when asserted against a director or of¿cer. Since there is an
identity of interest between the corporation and its agents, when the latter
authorize a violation of the former’s contractual obligations, there is
no contract with a third party as the tort requires.138 Therefore, as noted
above, the so-called Said v Butt “exception” simply reÀects the fact that
a corporation is liable for its own contractual obligations. Moreover, the
elements of the tort narrow its scope to circumstances that go beyond mere
aggressive competition. Speci¿cally, it requires knowledge of the thirdparty contract, the intent for the third party to breach it, and an act to
bring about the breach, all on the part of a corporate representative. As a
result, establishing these elements against a director or of¿cer will only be
possible in the clearest cases like ADGA Systems.139
Concerning the tort of deceit, a recent Supreme Court judgment
demonstrates how careful scrutiny of the elements is suf¿cient to ¿lter
unfounded personal claims. In Bruno Appliance and Furniture v Hryniak,140
the Ontario Court of Appeal had overturned the motion judge’s grant of
summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff in a deceit claim against
the principal of a company. On behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court,
Karakatsanis J agreed with the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that an
allegation of deceit had to proceed to trial because there was no evidence
that the principal personally made or directed his representatives to make
a false statement. In this case, the alleged deceit occurred in the absence
of the principal and was carried out by others. Thus, by insisting that the
elements of the tort be made out against the defendant, the courts stop
improper personal claims without resorting to a convoluted and potentially
unjust attribution analysis.
4. The business judgment rule
Notwithstanding the absence of statutory immunity for directors and
of¿cers, it may be argued that the tort law principles explained above
cannot be a complete solution to the problem of third-party liability. In
particular, the common law acknowledges that the decisions of directors
and of¿cers are entitled to deference pursuant to the business judgment
rule. As a result, directors and of¿cers are generally not liable for decisions
taken on behalf of the corporation that in hindsight were improvident. But
does this deference extend to decisions that are wrongful or tortious with
respect to a third party? In my view it does not.
138. See e.g. Drouillard, supra note 26 at para 26.
139. See ibid at paras 29-31.
140. 2014 SCC 8 at para 29.
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As the Supreme Court held in Kerr v Danier Leather Inc,141 the business
judgment rule is meant to protect business decisions from judicial secondguessing, not to excuse directors and of¿cers from their legal obligations.
That case was an investor class action based on the reporting issuer’s failure
to disclose, prior to the date of the public offering, lower than forecasted
sales, in breach of the Securities Act.142 The issuer and its of¿cers argued
that the business judgment rule applied to their decision not to disclose the
sales slump because it was a matter that involved sales forecasting. Binnie
J acknowledged the policy rationale behind the business judgment rule,
which is that managers are better suited than judges to evaluate business
risks and that too much judicial scrutiny may stiÀe the legitimate pursuit of
pro¿t.143 Nevertheless, Binnie J made an important distinction between the
of¿cers’ business judgment that the initial forecast would be met despite
a period of lower sales and the legal obligation to disclose material facts.
Assuming that the disclosure obligation was triggered, Binnie J said that
the of¿cers could have complied with it by disclosing the fact that sales
had fallen, but still relied on their business judgment to reaf¿rm their
initial forecast.144
Although Kerr was about a statutory obligation that was not subject to
the business judgment rule, Binnie J relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier
judgment in Peoples.145 In that case, a trustee in bankruptcy alleged that
the directors of the bankrupt company owed it a duty of care, which they
breached by adopting a procurement policy. In explaining the business
judgment rule, the Court distinguished between matters of business
expertise and legal obligation:
Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the
application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved
in corporate decision making, but they are capable, on the facts of
any case, of determining whether an appropriate degree of prudence
and diligence was brought to bear in reaching what is claimed to be a
reasonable business decision at the time it was made.146

The analysis in Peoples illustrates how this distinction works in practice.
The Court held that the objective of the procurement policy was to address

141. 2007 SCC 44 at para 54 [Kerr].
142. See RSO 1990, c S.5.
143. See Kerr, supra note 141 at para 58.
144. See ibid at para 55. As it turns out, the Court held that the statutory disclosure obligation was not
triggered in this case: see paras 43, 48.
145. See Peoples, supra note 96.
146. Ibid at para 67.

7KLUG3DUW\/LDELOLW\RI'LUHFWRUVDQG2I¿FHUV5HFRQFLOLQJ
&RUSRUDWH3HUVRQDOLW\DQG3HUVRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\LQ7RUW



the business’s dire ¿nancial situation, not to frustrate its creditors.147 In fact,
the Court noted that due to the structure of the business the directors had
no reason to disregard the interests of creditors. Although the procurement
policy did not prevent the debtor company’s demise, the Court held that an
unsuccessful business decision alone cannot give rise to liability. In other
words, the business judgment rule prevented a failed business decision
from becoming the object of liability in the absence of a breach of a legal
obligation.
As a result, the personal liability of directors and of¿cers in tort is
entirely compatible with the business judgment rule, which is properly
understood as a rule of deference toward legitimate business decisions, as
opposed to one that confers immunity for wrongdoing. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held, judges are capable of scrutinizing the legality
of business decisions, without questioning their commercial wisdom. A
business decision that amounts to a tort is properly the basis of personal
liability. But a business decision that was merely unsuccessful, or that
in hindsight was not the best option, is not actionable. This nuanced
interpretation of the business judgment rule ensures that the corporation is
not abused to pro¿t from torts.
&RQFOXVLRQ
There is no legal or policy reason to exempt directors and of¿cers from
the ordinary principles of tortious liability. The mistaken belief that not
doing so will undermine corporate personality has resulted in convoluted
and conÀicting judgments across Canadian jurisdictions, producing
uncertainty that disrupts business planning. While perhaps unpopular
among corporate counsel, a clear and simple rule that directors and of¿cers
are always responsible for their own wrongdoing according to the basic
principles of tort law will at least allow the relevant players to mitigate the
risk. This approach has the virtue of being what the legislature intended
and consistent with the Supreme Court’s corporate law jurisprudence.
Admittedly, a strictly tort-based analysis may make personal liability
more likely in small, closely-held corporations in which directors and
of¿cers tend to be more involved in business operations. But this does not
create a legal distinction between different types of corporations; whether
or not a director or of¿cer is personally liable will depend on the facts,
i.e., what he or she did. Therefore, while perhaps less likely, directors and
of¿cers of large, widely-held corporations may still be held personally
liable for torts when the circumstances warrant.
147. ,ELG at para 70.
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In assessing third-party tort claims, the courts ought to focus on a
single basic issue: whether the plaintiff has alleged or established that
the director or of¿cer was at fault, i.e., that he or she acted in a manner
that satis¿es the elements of a cause of action in tort. There is no need
to involve corporate law by trying to attribute the impugned conduct to
either the corporation or its representative as a threshold matter. There is
also no need to modify tort law principles by bringing into the analysis
policy considerations about the risk and bene¿ts of corporate versus
personal liability. The courts can apply a tort-based analysis with the
con¿dence that tort law principles are suf¿ciently robust to exclude claims
that truly undermine corporate personality, such as those that seek to hold
the corporate representative liable based on his or her position. While
the corporation may be vicariously liable for the acts of its servants, the
opposite is not also true. Thus, directors and of¿cers cannot be liable in
the absence of fault.
Although the Supreme Court has not offered signi¿cant guidance on
third-party liability of corporate agents, it has recently indicated that it
may follow a tort-based approach. In a seldom cited maritime law case,
Cromwell J referred to ADGA Systems with approval in holding that a
¿sherman was personally liable for cutting an underwater cable, even
though at the time he was conducting the business of a corporation.148 He
concluded that “corporate personality is not a relevant consideration in this
case since [the defendant] was personally negligent in cutting the cable.
The company is liable as a result of his acts, not the other way around.”149
Although it stops short of providing systematic guidance to lower courts,
perhaps this judgment will restore the law to its simplicity of a century
ago, when Idington J wrote: “The sooner presidents of companies realize
they have duties, the better for themselves and their fellow men.”150

148. Peracomo Inc v TELUS Communications Co, 2014 SCC 29 at para 17.
149. Ibid.
150. See Lewis, supra note 1 at para 27.

